Monday, March 23rd 2026
Now, 22 years after the March riots and in the light of reviewing the events of recent years, such as the terrorist attack in Banjska, the attack in Ibër-Lepenc and the capture of an espionage network linked to the BIA in Kosovo, the March riots take on a clearer political and strategic meaning. The events seem to be part of a logic where the security crisis, infiltration and destabilization are used to keep the north of Kosovo contested and the citizenship of Kosovo incomplete
Infrastructure and illegal control of the north (2000–2004)
After the war in Kosovo, the situation was not only characterized by institutional power and the establishment of transition by international missions, but at the same time by the establishment of a parallel reality by illegal structures Serbs in Serbian enclaves, especially in the north of Kosovo. The reports of international organizations, including the International Crisis Group (ICG), clearly described these phenomena and, therefore, in 2002, they clarified the influence and financing of Serbia for the division of Kosovo.
This group explicitly demanded pressure on Belgrade to stop support for the parallel structures north of Mitrovica. The report highlighted Belgrade’s infiltration of Kosovo and the financing of parallel structures, including the “Bridge Guards” group at the center. The report stated that the funding was provided directly by the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP) and constituted a violation of UN Resolution 1244. The same report also highlighted the fact that the International Mission of the United Nations (UNMIK), at that time, found it difficult to establish its authority across the Ibar, due to the presence of parallel Serbian institutions financed by Belgrade.
ICG asked the international community to make financial assistance to Serbia conditional on the cessation of support for parallel structures. Also, it was proposed that Serbia, because of these actions, be denied membership in the Council of Europe, in the Partnership for Peace with NATO and in the agreements with the EU. Analysts of the report argued that Belgrade would not cooperate in this regard without serious international pressure, equal to what was used to ensure cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, since political stability in Kosovo was at risk.
This report analyzed in detail, at the time, Serbia’s efforts to divide and cantonize Kosovo, identifying these as Belgrade’s strategy to keep the north under control and dictate the final status of Kosovo. The report stated that Mitrovica was de facto divided and that Belgrade’s goal was the final division of the province. The cantonization plan, as proposed by Belgrade, aimed at formal geographical division through a system of “self-rule”, where, according to this plan, Serbs would control 30% of Kosovo’s territory, divided into five cantons. In fact, the proposal was to divide according to the model of Bosnia and create “entities”.
The Serbs who pushed this idea the most were from the government of Serbia to those with positions in Kosovo. The list started with Vojslav Kostunica, prime minister at the time; Nebojsha Čović, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and leader of the coordination center for Kosovo; Branislav Krrstič, deputy director of the coordination center and author of the writings on which Čović’s proposals for cantonization were based; Oliver Ivanović, then a member of the “POVRATAK” coalition; Marko Jakšić, vice-president of the DSS party and radical leader in the north; as well as Millan Ivanovic, chairman of the Serbian National Council of Northern Kosovo, who, together with Jakšić, avoided cooperation with UNMIK and sought separation, etc. The aim was always to show that multi-ethnicity does not work.
At that time, ICG reported that Belgrade had poured into Kosovo over 50 million euros in the first eight months of 2001 alone. According to the reporters, the World Bank had to stop aid to Serbia’s budget, since this bank’s money indirectly ended up financing parallel structures.
How powerful and inviolable they were. these parallel structures are shown by the fact that, in a fight between the gang of Slavoljub Jovic “Pagi”, a member of the Bridge Guards, with UNMIK policemen, 26 policemen were injured by the latter.
All of this constituted a structural provocation and a creation of situations that led to the division of Kosovo through parallel structures, segregation systems, groups that maintained the tense situation through clashes, barricades road, bridge confrontations, etc.
March 2004 riots and indications of Serbia’s involvement
Even other reports of that time emphasized the element of Serbia’s tendencies for the cantonization of Kosovo or its division. In the “Human Rights Watch” report on the riots of March 2004, it was estimated that there were great concerns on the Albanian side from the establishment of “parallel institutions” from Belgrade. According to the report, the fear was also increased by the failure of UNMIK to challenge these structures and this allowed Belgrade to make the cantonization of Kosovo a completed act.
Also, the same report also mentioned the Bridge Guards as a group where violence was the starting point in every case, identifying as their meeting place the “Dolce Vita” cafe, which was located near the bridge.
Nebojsha Čović, in one of his interviews, told about a covert military operation carried out by Serbian forces in the name of protecting the Gracanica Monastery during the March riots. He stated that, together with a group of mainly paratroopers and police officers, they had crossed the border in a civilian vehicle and were stationed inside the church. He further added that he had contacted the KFOR commander to meet. The latter had told him that he could not meet him due to the distance, but when Čović informed him that he is already in Bitola and had arrived around 09:00 in the morning, this had surprised the KFOR commander. This statement by Čovic shows that Serbia knew in advance what was expected to happen in Kosovo.
Political exploitation of the unrest and the advancement of plans for division
In a report by Borut Grgic and Jana Urh, the presentation of the Belgrade plan, presented in April 2004, immediately after the March riots, for ethnic division is highlighted. The goal was an engineering separation through the decentralization of power on ethnic grounds, with autonomous regions leading to separation.
Another report, containing many analyzes by several authors, explained the same thing: how Belgrade was aiming for the division of Kosovo. Tim Judah argued that the Belgrade plan envisaged the creation of five autonomous Serbian districts that would form the “Autonomous Serbian Community of Kosovo and Metohija”. Janusz Bugajski also argued that the plan for “ethno-territorial decentralization” is an early attempt to divide Kosovo. At the time, Bugajski even warned that there is no third way for Kosovo between dependency and independence, and that delays in determining status encourage radicals and secessionist plans.
These unrest were used strongly by Belgrade against Kosovo’s move towards final status, arguing that multi-ethnic governance is unsustainable and pushing forward their plans for the cantonization and partition of Kosovo, which had started before the March riots.
On August 25, 2005, Nebojsha Čović was dismissed from his duties due to his frequent clashes with Kostunica, who held the position of prime minister at the time. Čović accused the government of lacking a clear strategy for Kosovo and blocking his initiatives. While, on the other hand, his dismissal was accompanied by serious accusations about the misuse of state funds intended for the Serbs in Kosovo, which were publicly intended mainly for the construction of houses that were never completed. These public accusations overshadow their failed use in the March riots.
Čović was then replaced by Sanda Rashković-Ivić, who had a closer approach to Kostunica.
Continuity of a strategy: from March 2004 to today
Now, 22 years after the March riots and in the light of reviewing the events of the last years, such as the terrorist attack in Banjska, the attack on Ibër-Lepenc and the capture of an espionage network linked to the BIA in Kosovo, the March riots take on a clearer political and strategic meaning. The events seem part of a logic where the security crisis, infiltration and destabilization are used to keep the north of Kosovo contested, Kosovo’s citizenship incomplete and to prevent its full consolidation. Therefore, March 2004 is presented as a provocation and incitement aimed at creating an environment where it was proven that multi-ethnicity does not work and that the division of Kosovo or its treatment as an unfinished issue remains a political option. Seen from a chronological perspective, from the events before March 2004, those after and until today, it is understood that there is a stable strategy aimed at the realization of Serbia’s plans for the division of Kosovo, which has changed in forms and models of action over the years, but not in goals. Precisely in this sense, crises do not appear only as episodes of violence, but also as tools to produce political consequences and to push forward objectives that Serbia has not been able to achieve by direct means. Transdisciplinarity in the analysis of these events offers an overview that removes the propaganda and puts the focus on the facts.
*Professor at the college “Universum” and external collaborator at ISLH “OCTOPUS”
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Source: prizrenpost
